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Economic Security: National Interests and International Solutions

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[Article by Igor Yevgenyevich Artemyev, candidate of historical sciences and sector head at Institute of World Economics and International Relations, USSR Academy of Sciences, and Sergey Sergeyevich Stankovskiy, candidate of economic sciences and scientific associate at Institute of World Economics and International Relations; words in boldface as published]

[Text] In spite of differences in political and economic systems, ideologies, and philosophies, all of the people in today's world have common vital interests. They are the product of mankind's long history and of the progress of productive forces, which were already crossing national borders in the last century. This is why K. Marx foresaw even then that the new era would witness the development of "world relations based on the interdependence of all mankind."¹

There is every reason to believe that this era began at the end of the 20th century. It was precisely in the last few decades that the internationalization of various facets of national life reached the point at which the interdependence of most of the states making up the world community became a fact.

Pros and Cons of Interdependence

Internationalization objectively creates promising opportunities for the progress of productive forces, the elevation of the standard of living of the broadest segments of the population, and the resolution of the global problems facing mankind. It also leads, however, to the appearance of new contradictions and the exacerbation of old ones. Some of them are connected with the natural process of the dissolution of traditional intra-national economic, political, and cultural contacts and with the appearance of a network of new international ties. Other contradictions occur when conflicts and disparities arising within a particular country move into the external sphere and then into the national economies of other states. Still others are the result of the inclusion of countries with differing levels of development and socio-political orientations, countries with interests diverging to the point of conflict, in a single system of multilateral interdependence.

The economic security of a single country can be threatened in different ways. Historically, nature has produced the most common threats—natural disasters and epidemics. Today these have been joined by the side effects of human economic activity—environmental pollution, accidents, and the depletion of sources of energy and raw

materials. Economic security can be threatened by cyclical recessions and crises, soaring prices, currency disorders, and the speculative export and import of capital.

Cyclical recessions, which usually begin in the developed capitalist countries, almost always lead to production cuts in the young states as well. The export revenues of the latter decline when activity in the world market is sluggish. They have to reduce their imports, including imports of the machines and equipment they need for industrialization and sustained economic growth.

The huge gap between the industrially developed and developing countries, where the absolute majority of mankind lives, has become threatening in itself. Underdevelopment, poverty, hunger, and disease can have the most serious socioeconomic and political consequences and can even cause upheavals which will affect the security of developed countries as well as developing states at a time of increasing interdependence.

Today technology is among the main factors determining the speed and nature of the economic development of states and their comparative advantages in the world market. The current and, in particular, future competitive potential of each country, and consequently its economic security, depend more and more on its ability to use scientific and technical achievements (including foreign ones) effectively in production and to adapt to changes in economic conditions as a result of scientific and technical progress.

The possibility of using the foreign economic sphere as an instrument of political pressure poses a serious threat. Many states are becoming increasingly aware of their vulnerability to deliberate actions restricting their economic independence and undermining their sovereign rights. These actions include the unilateral renunciation of existing agreements for the purpose of inflicting economic damage, trade boycotts, various sanctions and embargoes, and the manipulation of economic aid, credit, and access to technology for the purpose of influencing the recipient country's foreign and domestic policy.

Economically motivated actions to break or limit international economic ties are quite common. High selective tariffs, non-tariff restrictions, quotas on purchases of foreign goods, and the imposition of "voluntary limits" on exports allow a country to discriminate against its chief competitors while formally retaining an "open" economy. These actions are usually taken not only and not so much for political purposes. They reflect real difficulties in economic restructuring, during the course of which each country and whole groups of states try to find their place (and usually at the expense of other countries) in the changing system of international division of labor. Actions taken for the artificial deterrence of economic exchange, however, can pose a threat to the economic security of other countries and provoke the latter to take countermeasures.

In our interdependent world the interests of other states can be damaged not only by direct action in the foreign economic sphere, but also by a lack of consideration for the international consequences of domestic economic policy. The use of certain methods for the state regulation of national economies in some countries can threaten the economic security of other countries and the entire world community. The manipulation of interest rates to combat inflation, for example, can lead to the uncontrollable transfer of huge amounts of capital from one country to another, can immediately change the foreign payment status of many countries, and can influence the flow of goods and services. Just 10 or 15 years ago, the actions of many developing countries to attract foreign credit seemed to be their own internal affair, but now the debts of the "Third World" are threatening the stable development of the entire world credit system.

Other participants in international economic relations, such as transnational corporations and banks, often also pose a threat to economic security. When TNC's arrange for foreign production, they can exert considerable political influence on the economies of the host countries. Quite often, however, they do not consider the economic policies of the countries where they will be organizing their production and sales and do not take their development plans into account. Sometimes TNC's are also used as a channel for the exertion of political pressure on the governments of host countries.

In Search of Economic Security

Theoretically, the economic invulnerability of a particular country can be secured best by strong economic potential in a symmetrical structure of foreign economic transactions (the exchange of goods, services, technologies, capital, etc.) with each of its partners. In this case, its dependence on other states is tempered by their dependence on it. In reality, however, this kind of balance is rare even in the relations between industrially developed countries. Asymmetrical economic interdependence is more common.

For this reason, when an economic threat arises, each country generally strives, first of all, to minimize its dependence on economic transactions with unfriendly partners. To this end, these contacts are concentrated in allied countries or neutral states. This is accompanied by the dispersion of contacts with potentially hostile countries, so that the "critical levels of dependence"² on each of them will not be exceeded. Second, steps are taken to mobilize all of the human, physical, financial, scientific, and technical resources at the disposal of the state.

All countries take measures to strengthen their internal invulnerability and to deter external threats. It would be difficult to deny their validity, but in the absence of coordination or even mere regulation, unilateral actions by states in this sphere can lead to acute conflicts. After these conflicts first arise in the sphere of economic

relations, they often move into the sphere of politico-diplomatic or even politico-military relations. Seemingly justified means of securing economic invulnerability can easily be transformed into the means of injuring political opponents or economic rivals. History tells us, however, that the use of these means for political purposes is rarely effective. An analysis of 103 cases of trade and economic sanctions and embargoes between the end of World War I and the present day indicates that the results of these measures were extremely limited, and that even these limited results were possible only in comparatively small countries which depended on the "punishing" states for at least 20 percent of their foreign trade. Sanctions have been successful when the economy of the "punished" country has been relatively weak and when the actions of the "punishing" state have not caused its companies to suffer substantial losses.³

In reality, however, asymmetrical economic dependence does not always lead to unilateral invulnerability. One country's dependence on excessive imports from another might be cancelled out by the latter's export dependence. As a result, what is known as the asymmetrical relationship usually reflects the interdependence of partners. East-West economic relations are an example of this.

The dependence of the socialist countries on the capitalist world consists mainly in imports of some of the latest machines, equipment, and technologies and in the degree to which their foreign economic ties are influenced by fluctuations in world market conditions due to actions by Western countries (the manipulation of currency exchange rates, interest rates on loan capital, etc.). According to Western experts, a 10-percent increase in imports of machines and equipment from non-socialist countries would represent an increase of 1.1 percent in the growth of the USSR's national income, 2.5 percent in its industrial product, and 7.4 percent in the products of machine building. The branches of the Soviet economy distinguished by relatively strong dependence on imported Western equipment are the chemical, oil, and gas industries. There is perceptible dependence on certain goods—drilling equipment, large-diameter pipe (up to 65 percent, according to the estimates of Western experts), and auxiliary equipment for the operation of pipelines.⁴

Western grain represents a high percentage of all the grain consumed in the USSR. According to the authors' calculations, the failure to adapt our baking industry to the use of the soft wheat strains we mainly grow means that around 40 percent of the bread in the country is made of imported durum wheat. As for fodder grain—wheat and corn—we are still overly dependent in this area as well. Imported corn is used on virtually all of our poultry farms. Because of the exceptionally low assimilability of feeds and the tremendous losses of grain during harvesting, shipment, and storage, Western grain represents 20-25 percent of the forage used in livestock breeding.

The West is much less dependent on shipments from socialist countries. Even the percentage of Soviet oil and gas in total energy consumption in several capitalist countries, in spite of the assertions of some Western politicians, is not high enough to seriously jeopardize the energy security of these countries. We know that in 1982 NATO had already set "ceilings" for the energy dependence of bloc members on imports from socialist states—30 percent for all outside sources of gas and 10 percent for oil. Even in Italy and the FRG, which buy more fuel from the socialist states than any other NATO countries, the percentage of Soviet energy resources is far below the critical level.

When we look at the overall figures for East-West trade and foreign economic transactions, the East is still more dependent than the West. At the beginning of the 1980's more than 30 percent of the imports and 25 percent of the exports of CEMA countries were West-oriented, whereas the socialist countries accounted for just over 3 percent of all the imports and 4 percent of the exports of developed capitalist countries. The West is also much more progressive in the structure of its trade with the East.

These figures would seem to attest to the vulnerability of the socialist states. Of course, if the capitalist countries stop all shipments of machines, equipment, and technology to the Soviet Union, this will certainly hurt us and slow down the fulfillment of plans for socioeconomic development, but in view of the fact that purchases of Western manufactured items have never exceeded 3-5 percent of the Soviet Union's annual capital investments in fixed assets, the damage would not be that great. According to Western experts, the rate of industrial production in the USSR would decline no more than 0.5 percent in this case.⁵

The cessation of trade with the socialist countries, on the other hand, in 1986 and 1987, for example, would have reduced the annual average growth rate of the combined GNP of the Western countries by 0.1 percent according to our calculations. Furthermore, the hardest-hit industries would be the metallurgical and chemical industries and some subbranches of general and transport machine building in the West European countries and Japan. According to our calculations, a freeze on trade with the socialist countries would decrease production by 7 percent in the West German steel industry and by 2 percent in the Japanese chemical industry. In addition, several related branches would suffer. The refusal to export large-diameter pipe and the consequent decrease in the output of sheet metal could seriously undermine, for example, shipbuilding, where this metal is also used. Besides this, the disruption of existing foreign trade patterns at a time of sales difficulties in the world market could necessitate the expensive re-specialization of many production units. In general, however, we feel that the losses on both sides in the event of a trade moratorium would be greater than the potential advantages of the debilitation of the partner.

Therefore, the asymmetrical relationship certainly does not mean that its correction is essential to the guarantee of national security. On the contrary, a country's economic security might be strengthened through the expansion of ties with all members of the world community.

Experience has shown, in fact, that both the socialist and the capitalist countries are now more interested in strengthening their national economic security by means of broader international economic exchange, including East-West cooperation. The fact that the national economic security of socialist countries cannot be secured completely by unilateral actions is related to their inferiority to the West in the sphere of advanced technology, the underdevelopment of certain economic sectors, and the diminished effectiveness of authoritarian methods of economic management.

In turn, the national economic security interests of some capitalist countries necessitate broader trade with the East. When the West European states wanted to safeguard their energy security, for example, they did not curtail economic relations with the USSR substantially at the beginning of the 1980's in spite of the political pressure exerted by the United States, which is much less dependent on outside sources of energy. The expansion of agricultural exports, including exports to socialist countries, is viewed by ruling circles in many capitalist states as one of the main conditions of the survival of national producers in the highly competitive international food market.

In addition to national systems of security, there are some fairly well-developed systems of bloc security, based on political associations and regional unions. The bloc approach to the guarantee of economic security, however, is as inadequate as the unilateral actions of states. First of all, close political integration within some kind of alliance does not necessarily signify economic unity. Second, the bloc approach is essentially tantamount to autarchic reliance on the strength of a limited number of states, which will sooner or later impede the expansion of their international economic cooperation, with all of the ensuing negative consequences. Third, the attempt to strengthen the economic security of one group by weakening the security of another could destabilize international economic relations even more than unilateral actions by countries.

Therefore, genuine national economic security cannot be achieved through unilateral action. It can only be guaranteed in an atmosphere of international economic security.

Outlines of the System of Common Economic Security

In our opinion, the creation of a system of international economic security would demand collective efforts by the world community in the elaboration of a group of principles and standards of international economic relations which would protect all participants from any economically damaging actions by other states and other participants, promote the development of equitable and

mutually beneficial international division of labor and economic exchange, the dynamic and balanced economic growth of all countries, the restructuring of their economies, and their adaptation to the latest scientific and technical achievements, and contribute to the fuller use of the advantages of international division of labor. The achievement of international economic security would establish more favorable conditions for developing countries and aid in the stabilization and acceleration of their socioeconomic development. It would secure the effective prevention of any deliberate attempts to inflict economic injury, to employ coercive trade policies and practices, including the practices of TNC's, and to minimize the negative impact of outside factors on the economies of individual countries. Finally, international economic security should become the basis for military, political, and humanitarian security and promote the establishment and reinforcement of an international climate of trust, cooperation, and partnership.

To avoid deluding ourselves, however, we must realize that even the best system of international economic security cannot override the objective laws of world economics, and that its establishment will not mean the disappearance of competition, crises, inflation, environmental problems, and other such phenomena.

The goals of international economic security can be attained through concerted action by all members of the world community to regulate various forms of world economic ties: foreign trade, investment flows, currency relations, international scientific and technical contacts, and the exchange of information.

The dynamic development of **foreign trade** can be secured by strengthening the fundamental principles of international trade, such as the observance of most-favored-nation status and non-discrimination. This, however, does not exclude the right of developing countries (particularly the least developed) to more preferential treatment than most-favored-nation status. The creation of a system of international economic security also presupposes the reinforcement and continued development of a long-term negotiated basis for trade relations and the unconditional renunciation of the use of discriminatory practices for political purposes (with the exception of those instituted by a decision of the world community). International economic security presupposes the normalization of the international trade in raw materials, fuel, and food with consideration for the interests of exporters and importers. Some elements of this normalization could be the stabilization of agreements, a general fund for the stabilization of the trade in crude resources, to which many countries, including the USSR, would belong, guaranteed access to sources of raw materials, etc. Finally, the development of the international trade in services will necessitate the elaboration of multilateral principles and rules to prevent the further internationalization of the service sphere from causing serious conflicts.

In the regulation of **international investment activity**, it will be important to concentrate on the creation of the prerequisites for its expansion and the prevention of its possible negative effects on national economies. Here it will be important to strive for the optimal coordination of the interests of national states and transnational corporations. For this reason, the activities of foreign companies will have to be subject to national legislation, they will have to respect national sovereignty and give up restrictive and discriminatory practices, and they will have to provide regulatory agencies in their own countries and host countries with all of the necessary information about their economic operations. On the other hand, national laws on foreign investments will have to be stable and precise, and mutually acceptable procedures will have to be formulated for the nationalization of foreign property and the guaranteed payment of compensation to its owners.

In the sphere of **currency and finance**, the currency system will have to be reformed in order to stabilize international currency and financial relations, preclude the discriminatory and tyrannical treatment of some countries by others, and establish an effective mechanism of intergovernmental exchange rate regulation. This will require the coordination of the currency policies of all countries, the creation and broader use of collective units of payment, the assignment of greater importance in international transactions to the currencies of countries other than the United States, commensurate with their role in the world economy, and the democratization of the activities of international monetary organizations.

The radical resolution of the **debt problem** will necessitate concerted effort by debtors and creditors and their acceptance of equal responsibility for the settlement of the debt crisis. The interests of the entire world community would be served by such measures as the limitation of debt service payments to a level not inhibiting the socioeconomic development of debtor countries, the extension of preferential credit to developing states on a broader scale, the conversion of part of the debt into securities and their distribution among creditors, the expansion of the system of preferences of developed countries, their observance of UN objectives in the sphere of official preferential development aid, and the creation of a specialized international organization for the purchase of debts at a discount.

Of course, the Soviet Union has never had any colonies or dependent territories and is therefore not responsible for the economic underdevelopment of many Third World countries (which is what eventually led to the unprecedented growth of their debts). Nevertheless, the USSR is willing to share the financial burden of solving the problem. As M.S. Gorbachev stressed in his speech in the United Nations, it can only be solved with an internationalized approach. The Soviet Union has already expressed its willingness to defer the payments on the debts of the least developed countries for up to 100 years and to cancel these debts in some cases.

To overcome the tendency toward stronger "technological nationalism," it will be necessary to develop all existing forms of **scientific and technical contacts**: international cooperation in scientific production, joint ventures, and collective research and development projects. There must be clear distinctions between goods and technologies used directly for military purposes and the "dual-purpose" items, and the unjustifiably broad interpretation of these concepts (especially the second one) must be avoided.

It would be useful to arrange for cooperation between export control agencies in the CoCom [Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Control] countries and the states subject to the export regulations of this organization. The organization of CoCom inspections and verifications of the use of dual-purpose technology imported from the West in socialist countries, on the condition of the protection of commercial secrets, could promote broader trade in these goods and allay the suspicions of certain Western groups with regard to the non-military nature of their use.

The normalization of international scientific and technical exchanges would do much to promote the completion of the reform of the international patent system, the adoption of a UN code of behavior in technology transfers, and a negotiated solution to the "brain drain" problem.

The frank disclosure of national economic and foreign trade policies, the absence of restrictions on inclusion in the international information infrastructure, and the elaboration of "standards" recognized by the international community for the statistical elucidation of economic indicators are important conditions of international economic security.

The United Nations, especially its economic agencies, should play the key role in the creation of the system of common economic security. It could initiate multilateral agreements on the renunciation of coercive practices in trade and economic relations and the non-acceptance of economic sanctions not approved by the international community. It would be useful to create a mechanism to inform countries of the institution of trade and economic restrictions due to extraordinary circumstances or economic difficulties.

At this time the projected system of international economic security represents only a general idea about the necessity and importance of excluding or at least considerably reducing outside threats to the economic development of countries through concerted effort. It will be extremely important for the maximum number of states to participate in the elaboration of this concept. This will provide the momentum for a search for common elements in different approaches to the resolution of world economic problems, the intensification of international cooperation for development purposes, and the reinforcement of trust.

Footnotes

1. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Works," vol 9, p 230.
2. One country's "critical level of dependence" on another (or on a group of other states) generally signifies a ratio of imported (or, sometimes, exported) goods, capital, technology, and so forth to the country's domestic production (or reserves) at which the curtailment of economic contacts with the foreign partner could seriously disrupt the country's own reproductive mechanism.
3. G. Hufbauer and F. Schott, "Economic Sanctions Reconsidered. History and Current Policy," Washington, 1985, pp 20, 41-42.
4. M. Bornstein, "The Transfer of Western Technology to the USSR," OECD, Paris, 1985.
5. See, for example, S. Gomulka and A. Nove, "Contribution to Eastern Growth: An Econometric Evaluation," OECD, Paris, 1984, p 24; "Soviet Machinery Imports," SURVEY, Spring 1978, pp 112-126. We should explain that the overall rate of increase is 100 percent in these calculations. If we take, for example, the actual indicator for 1987—3.8 percent—the hypothetical curtailment of all deliveries from the West would cause the number to decline to 3.781 percent ($3.8 - 3.8 \times 0.05$).

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For a Realistic View of Life in the United States

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[Article by Arnold and Lorraine Lockshin, American citizens who had to leave the United States with their three children because of their political convictions. In 1986 the USSR Supreme Soviet decided to grant them political asylum. Doctor A. Lockshin works in the All-Union Oncological Scientific Center of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences in Moscow. The Lockshins are still keeping track of events in the United States and write articles about life in that country, about imperialist propaganda, and about the psychological warfare of the U.S. special services; passages in boldface as published]

[Text] To put it plainly, what is the United States really like? In comparison with the USSR, it has a higher standard of living in general, developed forms of apparent democracy, and other advantages we will be discussing later. It also has serious unsolvable problems and a shortage of real political democracy. There is a huge gap between the rich and the poor.

Academician G.A. Arbatov provides an accurate description of the urbanized centers: "Most Soviet people cannot even imagine how horrible many of the central neighborhoods of the biggest American cities

look—Detroit, Chicago, Harlem and the Bronx in New York, etc. These are ugly neighborhoods which sometimes appear to have been through a war. Besides this, they are dangerous neighborhoods where people are afraid to go out on the streets.”¹

Whole neighborhoods in American cities have become “combat zones” where even the police are afraid to enter, according to the weekly U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT (10 April 1989).

Only a small percentage of black Americans make an adequate living. Most of them live out their lives in poverty and despair, in terrible living conditions, are plagued by unemployment, and run the risk of becoming the victims of criminals and drug dealers. The Latin American ghettos are growing quickly in the United States, as quickly as people come here from Mexico, Puerto Rico, and Central and South America, where the living conditions are even worse and life is even more hopeless. Incidentally, the life of the poor in the rural United States is hardly any better. Soviet people watch rock concerts and sports competitions on television and listen to commentators and guests from America who talk about how wonderful life is in the United States, but do many of them know how people live in the Rio Grande valley in Texas?

“There is a poverty belt on the U.S.-Mexico border where the living conditions are even more hopeless than in Appalachia,” NEWSWEEK magazine commented. “Around 250,000 American citizens live there in more than 400 crowded rural slums. The rate of unemployment reaches as high as 50 percent, the water supply is completely polluted, and chronic diseases rage through the region on a massive scale.... In some cases water quality is so low that even bathing in it can cause disease.... Doctors in the valley are always working overtime: They have to treat the kind of diseases that are found only in the developing countries.... In spite of this, the government program covering 85 percent of the cost of medical assistance was cancelled.”²

More and more children in the United States—20 percent in 1987—live in poverty,³ and 25 percent never finish high school.⁴ These official statistics are usually understated. Although the United States has not experienced any economic crises during this period, “we can say without exaggeration,” SCIENCE magazine remarked, “that the United States has been in a state of constant depression for the last 15 years, during which family income has stayed the same or decreased.”⁵ It is probable that the worst is yet to come: For example, an article in TIME magazine on 22 May this year said that economists predict a further decline in the standard of living of millions of Americans.

Whereas one-fifth of the Americans or more live in poverty (this includes the people suffering from malnutrition), many more are living in debt and without adequate social protection. An unforeseen event—an illness, the closure of an enterprise, a drop in oil prices,

or an industrial accident—can change a family’s future dramatically and tragically. Stress and other negative factors play an important role in the psychological development of the average American.

The pensions of millions of elderly Americans are being eroded by inflation, their medical benefits have been cut, and their social guarantees are far below the necessary level. According to the 15 May issue of TIME magazine, 37 million Americans cannot afford medical insurance and millions more do not have adequate coverage. A short visit to a doctor can cost 30 dollars or more. A day’s stay in a hospital costs several hundred dollars, and the cost of medical services is rising at a rate of 15 percent a year. The lack of adequate medical insurance can be a genuine disaster for the American family.

The cost of a higher education, which is essential in the high-paying jobs securing a comfortable lifestyle, is constantly rising. Parents often have to pay 20,000 dollars a year or more to cover their children’s college tuition and board costs,⁶ and many young people simply have no chance of getting a higher education.

The general moral and psychological atmosphere in America is far from untroubled or ideal. Observers have said that American pop and rock music is now less likely to express satisfaction and joy than the younger generation’s feelings of alienation, fear, and helplessness.⁷

The huge national debt, which is largely a product of the corrupt system of big military contracts, places a heavy burden on the national economy and, according to many bourgeois economists, poses a serious threat to its stability. The U.S. Government has become involved in a multibillion-dollar program to assist bankrupt financial institutions and will soon have to pay out additional tens of billions of dollars for the decontamination of territories polluted by radioactive waste as a result of violations of disposal regulations.

People in the United States are seriously worried that the national debt, the disruption of the balance of trade, and the influence of other factors could lead to a financial crisis capable of causing a dramatic decline in the standard of living of many, if not most, Americans.

Many Soviet citizens know little about these real aspects of life in the American society. Who benefits from the concealment of capitalism’s most unattractive features and from the comparison of life in the Soviet Union to only the best aspects of American life?

It would be just as wrong to ascribe only negative features to the United States. Although social injustice is apparent there, the material standard of living of most Americans is much higher than that of Soviet citizens. The level of technology is also higher. Many goods which are scarce in the USSR are quite common in the United States. They include television sets, tape recorders, automobiles, and many kitchen and home appliances. Americans have access to a variety of foods at virtually any time—if they have enough money.

Furthermore, routine business operations can be conducted more efficiently and more simply in the United States. The purchase and sale of goods or materials are several times easier. The telephone is a reliable medium of business communication there. Credit cards, bank checks, computerization, and higher efficiency shorten or eliminate many of the tiresome and distressing procedures that are common in the USSR.

It might even seem to the inexperienced observer that the United States is close to the allowance of extensive political freedom and minimal government interference in the personal lives of citizens.

Some people might say in all sincerity that the negative features of life in the United States are of no concern to the Soviet people. We often hear that it is better to learn from "backward" capitalism, in order to perfect life and democracy in a state of "progressive" socialism, than to revile the former for its negative aspects. Of course, we must learn lessons from positive experience, but **indiscriminate praise of the wealth and "freedom" in the capitalist society distorts the facts and can be absolutely dangerous.**

Let us discuss four important aspects in detail.

First, the U.S. economy did not develop on its own. Its banks and corporations make billions of dollars on the goods and labor of economically dependent countries. Low-paid, and often extremely low-paid, workers in the Third World countries produce at least half of the electronic items, clothing, fabric, footwear, and many other goods. The average Americans who can be seen on the pages of AMERIKA magazine or on Soviet television do not owe their contented expressions only to their own labor. It might be worthwhile to calculate what the standard of living would be in the United States if there had been no imperialist robbery in the world.

Second, the American political and social system, which has been developing for decades in competition with socialism, has perfected sophisticated methods of struggle against the most serious internal conflicts. The partial coverage of unemployment insurance, benefits for the poor, some civil rights, and so forth are not only concessions to the direct pressure of the masses. It is in the interest of the ruling class to institute a few reforms to prevent massive public displays of dissatisfaction.

Third, real American policy diverges sharply from the embellished image. The actions of the U.S. political system are too varied and complex for their adequate discussion here, but we can summarize the main aspects. Democracy is allowed only within strictly limited and "safe" confines. Election campaigns, congressional debates, the civil and criminal courts, the moderately critical news media, and even exposures and scandals serve a purpose. It is convenient for the ruling class to allow the competition of interests and ideas, permit

struggle within the capitalist class, and satisfy the political demands of the people within the established framework of debates and procedures. Of course, it is important that all of this have a truly democratic appearance—for everyone, and not just for the elect.

As soon as the government encounters potential or real opposition to the system, however, democracy turns into a fiction and freedom is replaced by covert police procedures in which genuine political rights are unceremoniously ignored. In our book "Silent Terror,"⁸ we describe part of this covert and dirty policy, including the extensive use of the U.S. intelligence community.

It is particularly important for the ruling class to prevent the formation of truly popular and progressive movements. It spares no efforts, money, human resources, or media for mass deception. Clever and carefully orchestrated methods of falsification and silent repression have taken shape over decades of class struggle within the country and opposition to socialism, the national liberation movement, and the workers' movement in the world arena.

The poverty and injustice, the colossal military expenditures, the declining standard of living, and racial discrimination should have given birth to progressive mass movements in the country, but after World War II (with the exception of the brief period immediately following the war and the period of struggle for civil rights in the 1960's and against the war in Vietnam), opportunities for the creation of a broad and powerful progressive social movement in the United States were never utilized. Today protests are voiced mainly by weak and ineffective movements, which are only a shadow of the objectively possible movements. The American working class seems strangely passive. Six out of every seven American workers do not even have elementary union protection: In the 1950's labor unions united 30 percent of all non-agricultural workers, but the figure in 1985 was only around 14 percent.⁹

The discrepancy between the potential capabilities and the real struggle of the masses is of decisive importance to an understanding of the present state of domestic politics in the country.

Fourth, one of the United States' tremendous advantages over the USSR is the efficient and reliable fulfillment of agreements, particularly in economics, science, and other decisive areas.

In spite of this, bureaucratism (for lack of a better term) is poisoning the lives of the poor and defenseless in the United States. The person who applies for unemployment compensation and medical or other social assistance might have to undergo exhausting, discouraging, and humiliating experiences. Besides this, the gigantic intelligence community displays the highest artistry (as we tried to reveal in our book) in comprehensive and persistent provocative and subversive activity. Artificially created problems are heaped on top of one another, and then everything is misrepresented to create

the impression that all of this is largely the result of the mistakes and shortcomings of opponents.

Aside from the special services, which deliberately create difficulties of this kind, the United States does not have the social stratum which has spread through the USSR and is complicating, impeding, and muddling the normal course of events. Our most serious problems with bureaucracy here have arisen during our dealings with the publisher of our book and with representatives of the news media—i.e., precisely the people who call themselves frontline soldiers in the war against red tape, formalism, and callousness and who are in a position to influence millions of people.

The skewed portrayal of American life in the Soviet Union is an important ideological issue, particularly during the current period of difficulties. If the United States and capitalism are portrayed primarily as the vehicles of genuine democracy, securing happiness and a good life for almost everyone, it is logical to assume that capitalism is preferable to socialism. This issue is the subject of lively discussions here, particularly among Soviet youth, and it would be wrong to believe that the United States does not care how deeply the bourgeois ideology has penetrated our society and what kind of influence it is having on events in the USSR.

The newspaper MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI, which also comes out in an English edition, frequently praises the United States and prints frankly pro-American propaganda, unaccompanied by serious critical commentaries or the expression of alternative points of view. Just before General Secretary M.S. Gorbachev left for the United States for a meeting with then President R. Reagan, CBS News correspondent Dan Rather was offered a column in the 15 November 1987 edition of MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI. "We want Gorbachev to understand," he wrote, "that our [U.S.] glasnost is 200 years old." The newspaper did not print any rebuttals of Rather's interesting interpretation of American democracy and history (the 200 years of "glasnost" included the massive and brutal capture, purchase, and sale of people in the slave trade and the criminal penalties for those who taught slaves to read and write).

An article praising President George Bush was in the 13 November 1988 edition of MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI. It said that Bush had "proved his bravery," that "his professional career has been impressively kaleidoscopic" (including a stint as "director of the CIA"), that "money did not become the purpose of his life," that "laziness has never been one of Bush's features," that "he has many friends," that "people believe that he has a natural affinity with talented people, impressing them with his loyalty, concern, and courtesy," that "what the Americans value most in their new leader is his...prudence, integrity, intelligence, reliability, and sincerity," and so forth. This much praise is not even characteristic of American newspapers.

"Just Like in America" is the title of an article by an American reporter on a Moscow neighborhood rally (MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI, 23 April 1989). According to him, in the United States "ordinary citizens" make all of the decisions in local government. "In many cases the result is a compromise. Some construction organizations or their clients agree to set aside part of the land for a park, and others donate money to cover the needs of schools." The leaders of the Moscow neighborhood, the author says, "were consistently striving for this extremely important right to self-government," which supposedly already exists in the United States.

MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI did not publish any other point of view on the "generosity" of big business or on the "self-government" in the United States. Real glasnost should always include objectivity and balance.

Soviet television, which is watched by tens of millions of people, has even more influence. The programs appealing to many young people often include conversations or video clips revealing (or tacitly presupposing) how wonderful life is in the United States. The prevailing image of the United States is that of a country which cares about people, lives in racial harmony, and guarantees liberty and justice.

Although more objective points of view can sometimes be found in Soviet publications, the Soviet news media are more likely to portray the United States in rosy hues. The alleged justification is that this image is a reaction to the earlier years when America was presented in an overly negative light. This explanation does not sound valid to us. From the political standpoint, "ultra-rightist" mistakes cannot compensate for "ultra-leftist" mistakes. Both are mistakes and both can give rise to serious problems.

When the news media reported only the negative aspects of life in America, they lost credibility because many people knew that life was better there in some respects than in the Soviet Union. Under these conditions, even sound criticism can be regarded as mere "propaganda." Today, the overly positive evaluation of the capitalist society under the banner of glasnost and truth might be taken at face value.

If we look at the other side, at how the U.S. news media have portrayed the Soviet Union since the start of perestroika, we see that the reports are not as favorable as we have been led to believe. Their tone has changed, and some positive articles have been printed, which rarely happened in the past. The most favorable articles are probably those dealing with the Soviet Government's recent international political initiatives, but there has been nothing to suggest that the U.S. news media have lost their fundamental hostility toward socialism.

Their reaction is more complex today. On the one hand, they have to react to the new political thinking and the development of democracy in the Soviet Union. On the other, they underscore the difficulties in the USSR and the dissatisfaction of the population and say that

Marxism-Leninism is an obsolete philosophy. The press is spinning fantasies about the struggle within the national leadership and is predicting the collapse of socialism.

Openly anti-Soviet articles are still a common sight even in the most respectable press organs.

The WASHINGTON POST, for example, printed a fairly long article about Robert Robinson, the author of an anti-Soviet book who spent many years in the Soviet Union. The article was reprinted in the INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE (15 March 1989). Robinson now lives in Washington and, as the article says, "is keeping a low profile because he is afraid of a Soviet vendetta." We could sympathize with Robinson if he were afraid of the high crime rate in Washington (1.3 murders a day),¹⁰ but this is not why he is worried. The American press is taking Robinson's imaginary "alarm" seriously: The Soviet Union might send an assault force to the capital of the United States to cripple or kill him! "It is now that I have to be careful," Robinson said, "because many people do not understand the Russian mind: Once you insult the Russians, they never forgive you. Never."

Two recently published books about the Soviet Union have been given extensive press coverage in the United States: "The Great Failure: The Birth and Death of Communism in the 20th Century," by Zbigniew Brzezinski, former assistant to the president for national security affairs, and "The Impending Soviet Crash: Gorbachev's Desperate Search for Credit in the Western Financial Market," by Judy Shelton, researcher from the Hoover Institute. A lack of appreciation for perestroika is implicit in the very titles of the books.

In the American press the Soviet Union is still being portrayed as a "Stalinist empire"¹¹ or as the "empire fostering a belief in the beginning of the end."¹² The encouragement of anti-Soviet separatism and nationalism is also common. An article in the INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE (11 March 1989), reprinted from THE NEW YORK TIMES, for example, quotes a Ukrainian "fighter for human rights": "We believe that the question of whether the Soviet Union will survive or not will be decided in the Ukraine, and not in Estonia."

The list of these examples could go on. In general, the American press is not paying any attention to the positive side of perestroika. Although the image portrayed in the press has been adapted to changing conditions, it is still primarily negative and it benefits the opponents of socialism.

The propagandists of American capitalism are experts in advertising their system. They misrepresent themselves as free and unbiased champions of the truth and do not require any assistance whatsoever from the news media here in spreading their lies.

There is no question that the American people must decide what kind of social structure America should have. The Soviet Union's new initiatives, aimed at improving relations with the United States, can only be applauded. There is no question that the two countries have common objectives: They must avert nuclear war and solve ecological problems and some other important problems transcending the boundaries of mere class and national interests. This is one side of current reality.

Another side is the fact that imperialism is opposed by its very nature to the working class, to progressive and national liberation movements and, above all, to socialism. Hypocritical words sometimes conceal this antagonism. The U.S. ruling class not only has weapons for military purposes, but is also using destabilizing propaganda, taking advantage of ethnic, economic, and other problems within the socialist countries, and engaging in subversive activity, which was revealed, for example, by the American interference in the June events in China and the recent elections in Poland.¹³

The Soviet Union is undergoing a necessary but difficult and, quite probably, lengthy period of renewal. New and ingenious positive ideas are taking root and are coexisting with confusion and doubts about the viability of socialism. "It is no secret," M.S. Gorbachev said, "that people in the West, who have displayed a tremendous interest in our perestroika, in the reforms in China, and in similar processes in other socialist countries, are arguing over the degree to which these processes represent the development of socialism or a departure from it. Some are not concealing their hope that the institution of economic cost accounting, market relations, glasnost, and democracy will lead, if not to the restoration of capitalism, then to some kind of mixed form of social structure."¹⁴

It is true that the American press is full of suggestions about the implementation of the "main strategy," namely how to take advantage of the increased openness and existing difficulties in socialist countries to weaken communist ideals and undermine internationalism and the very bases of the socialist society with injections of Western capital and the spread of Western culture and political beliefs.

Of course, it is useful to study the best aspects of life in America or other countries and to adapt them to our own needs, but it is a completely different matter to create the impression, whether deliberately or not, that capitalism, including the capitalism in a country as rich and strong as the United States, is preferable to socialism. This idea in all of its different forms is erroneous and could be quite dangerous.

Footnotes

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3. SCIENCE, 1988, vol 242, p 873.

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8. A. and L. Lockshin, "Silent Terror. The Political Persecution of the Family in the United States," Moscow, Academy of Pedagogical Sciences, 1989.
9. SCIENCE, 1987, vol 238, p 915.
10. GUARDIAN, 16 May 1989.
11. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 29 April 1989.
12. NEWSWEEK, 3 April 1989.
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"SShA—ekonomika, politika, ideologiya", 1989

DISCUSSIONS

From Confrontation to Cooperation

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IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 10, Oct 89
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[Article by Vitaliy Yuryevich Vasilkov, candidate of historical sciences and scientific associate at Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies]

[Text] One of the important foreign policy guidelines of perestroika, in an area which was previously overloaded with ideological stereotypes, is the objective of a "collective search for ways of resolving conflicts," including the conflicts in southern Africa, "in the interest of common security," signifying "security for all."¹

The most fundamental questions connected with the settlement of regional conflicts is the question of their causes and the question of the role played in these conflicts by outside forces, especially the great powers.

The first question is related to the distinctive features of a specific stage in the internal development of most of the countries in the Third World, and in this sense it is an objective matter and is independent of outside influence, although the prevailing tendency in world politics can either promote the spread of conflicts, directly and indirectly, or contribute to their cessation. The second depends largely on the aims of the outside forces pursuing their own goals in regional crises and therefore has little to do with objective local realities.

Therefore, on the one hand, regional conflicts can be regarded as the developing countries' unavoidable repetition of the historical journey taken by the nations of the Old World, a journey which was full of violence. The present stage in the development of most countries in the Third World indicates the possibility of more pronounced conflicts in connection with the natural processes of national establishment, economic and political development, and the struggle for power and influence in these countries. On the other hand, the existence of a broad sphere of purposeful outside influence is equally objective. This influence can change the scales and nature of crises considerably and can even control them in some cases.

Military force has traditionally been used as a means of settling regional conflicts, and in recent decades its use has increased considerably, both in the quantitative and the qualitative sense. At the same time, the limits of its effectiveness and the possibility of obtaining stable political results in this manner have become increasingly apparent. Above all, this has been obvious in conflicts in which the great powers have been directly involved—i.e., in the most dangerous conflicts—because the other side has tried to secure a military deadlock. It was demonstrated most clearly in Vietnam and Afghanistan. This kind of situation can be regarded as the natural result of the limitations on the use of military force. Apparently, the sphere of influence of this mechanism will expand objectively and will take in conflicts in which the great powers are involved only indirectly or not at all. The cessation of the Iran-Iraq war is a good example. It appears that this auspicious process could be accelerated through the purposeful use of precautionary and preventive political consultations between the great powers before military force is actually used on the battlefield and even before the decisions to use military force have been made. The generally positive unofficial interaction of the USSR and the United States Rothchild mentions provides reason to believe in the possibility of cooperation of a higher order.

The transfer from sporadic consultations to a permanently operating negotiation mechanism for the prevention of regional conflicts might be considered. The organization of an international independent scientific center also warrants consideration because its recommendations with regard to potential conflicts could play a significant role in governmental decisionmaking. The crisis in southern Africa, where the USSR and the United States have accumulated considerable experience in confrontation and missed opportunities, requires precisely this kind of approach.

Sources of Confrontation

On 15 January 1975 three Angolan groups—the MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA—reached an agreement with the Government of Portugal in the Portuguese city of Alvor on the date and conditions of the granting of independence to Angola and agreed on the division of power and on the organization of elections immediately following

the declaration of independence. It seemed that this decision should have satisfied everyone, but the inevitable rivalry of the three groups should have been foreseen (but not encouraged).

On 31 January the transitional government took power. The telegram it received on 21 February from Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers A.N. Kosygin applauded this fact and called it a "great victory for the Angolan people."² On 21 January, however, the "Forty Committee," an inter-agency group in Washington directing CIA operations, had already allocated 300,000 dollars for covert aid to the FNLA. Even this minor move (which was certainly only the beginning) was enough to provoke civil war in Angola. It is also indicative that UNITA did not receive any U.S. aid until July because the Americans believed at that time that the MPLA and UNITA might find a common language and form a united front against the FNLA. The decision of the Forty Committee in January was based on earlier contacts with the FNLA and the tenacious habit of thinking in terms of "our team," which compelled the administration to choose one side. Furthermore, in September 1975 the CIA was already forbidding UNITA leader J. Savimbi to investigate the possibility of a settlement agreement with the MPLA. "We did not need soft allies," explained J. Stockwell, the former head of the CIA operational group in Angola. Therefore, we must agree with State Department staffer W. Smith: "The United States is responsible for beginning the series of actions which put an end to the Alvor agreement and led to a bloody civil war. This move was not dictated by concern for American interests. On the contrary, it was unnecessary and stupid."⁴ At the same time, it was completely natural, because "the secretary of state and the President...regarded the situation in Angola as part of Soviet-American relations, and not as an African problem," and "were looking for a chance to challenge the Soviets."⁵

In this situation, the USSR and Cuba had no choice but to take the appropriate countermeasures, and these secured the MPLA victory at the beginning of 1976. Political inertia, however, is a dangerous thing. In hindsight, we must admit that after the MPLA victory the USSR should have chosen a bolder and more farsighted, although more difficult, policy. An attempt to reconcile the MPLA and UNITA at that time would probably have been in the interest of the Angolan people, because its success would have guaranteed a more representative government and the necessary conditions for the peaceful development of the country. This move would have strengthened the government because UNITA units had the support of the public in the country's southern regions, and it would have been quite beneficial from the standpoint of Luanda's political prestige. Finally, this would have eliminated all of the grounds for the talk about the "victories" and "defeats" of the East and West, would have made further confrontation senseless,

and would have established the prerequisites for cooperation by the USSR and the United States in the regulation of the situation in Rhodesia.

Missed Opportunities

This attempt might have been successful, but it was not made. Instead of this, at the 25th CPSU Congress in February 1976 L.I. Brezhnev said that the MPLA victory was due to the "present balance of world class forces." The Soviet-Mozambican communique of May 1976 said that "the present era is distinguished by more intense struggle by the people for national and social liberation." The Soviet-Angolan statement of 14 October 1976 spoke of imperialism's "loss" of its influence in southern Africa and of its desire to "take revenge."⁶ In this way, the events in southern Africa were categorically interpreted as a "victory" for the East and a "defeat" for the West, as a result of a balance of power in socialism's favor, and as a factor strengthening this balance and securing the further "intensification of struggle" against imperialism.

The speculative calculations of the notorious "balance of forces," the pedantic theories of socialist orientation, and the abstract desire for "ideological purity" did not do the USSR any good, but they require a thorough investigation in themselves. Something else is important in our discussion. It is true that in 1975 and 1976 the United States was openly trying to install regimes meeting its own requirements in southern Africa, to preserve the "white citadel," and to "defeat" the USSR. After the bloody coup in Chile in 1973 (which had the blessing of the United States), after the Americans impeded the development of Soviet-American trade in 1974, and after the U.S. administration decided that it did not want to discuss events in southern Africa with the USSR (to mention just a few factors), it lost most of its credibility with Moscow. Other significant factors were the hostile posture of South Africa and the factor of Soviet-Chinese rivalry. We must admit, however, that the USSR's policy in Angola in 1975 and 1976 also represented an acceptance, to say the very least, of Washington's "rules of play" in a no-win game. After all, there is no documented evidence that the USSR tried to discuss the situation in Angola with the United States or to reconcile the MPLA and UNITA. It is true that Cuba reduced its troops in Angola unilaterally twice, in 1976 and in 1979, in an attempt to settle the conflict in the region, but its opponents did not display reciprocal restraint. Obviously, the tension in the region had reached the point at which "diplomatic allusions" were not enough. The situation demanded more serious agreements.

When changes in U.S. policy were announced by H. Kissinger on 22 March 1976 in Dallas, where he spoke in support of a black majority government in Rhodesia and against armed intervention, the USSR did not take this seriously either.⁷ Of course, in Kissinger's speech there were strong elements of what even friendly observers described as "an attempt to use diplomacy to save at

least part of something that could not be gained by force."⁸ It was a serious mistake, however, to underestimate the potential for a negotiated settlement of the conflict in Rhodesia and not to consider the possibility of cooperation by the USSR and the United States in this area, at least under the next administration.

Nothing changed under the Carter administration either. Its initial program, however, included several constructive ideas in addition to the negotiated settlement idea it had inherited from the Republicans. "The basis of our position," Secretary of State C. Vance said, for example, "is an attempt to view the Africans and their problems in the context of African reality, and not as an arena for East-West disagreements.... We would welcome Soviet assistance, which we are regrettably lacking, in achieving a peaceful transition to a majority government in Rhodesia, Namibia, and everywhere else in Africa."⁹ Of course, we might have doubted the sincerity of these statements, but there was no reason at all to respond with overly ideological ultimatums.

During his visit to Africa in March and April 1977, Chairman N.V. Podgorny of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium announced in Maputo that Angola and Mozambique represented the "crest of a powerful anti-colonial, antiracist wave," and that their borders with Rhodesia and South Africa were "class boundaries as well as boundaries between states." In reference to the possibility of peaceful political solutions to the problems of Rhodesia, Namibia, and South Africa, he could say "only one thing: Gentlemen, give up your power to the majority of the population—i.e., to the true representatives of the Africans—and put an end to the policy of apartheid, and then the problem will cease to exist."¹⁰

There was trouble from the very beginning in the USSR's relations with the Carter administration, but the U.S. approach to the settlement of conflicts in southern Africa was clearly distinguished from general U.S. strategy by its realism and by the willingness to make the necessary compromises. Even if this was the result of purely pragmatic appraisals of the situation in Rhodesia, it is possible that the USSR's agreement to a constructive dialogue on this matter could have provided the momentum for favorable changes in the overall climate of Soviet-American relations and could have alleviated or precluded the subsequent confrontations between the two countries in 1977 and 1978 during the uprisings in Shaba Province in Zaire and the conflict in the Horn of Africa. It is even possible that events in Afghanistan might have turned out quite differently. Unfortunately, this opportunity was also missed.

In this way, both sides were stretching detente to the limit, even though they knew that it could not take this kind of pressure. The group of Soviet-American agreements of the early 1970's simply did not include any direct agreements on regional conflicts. The extension of the coordinated general principles of interrelations to this sphere would have signified an excessively broad interpretation. Each side could interpret these principles

in its own favor: The USSR could interpret them as U.S. consent to regard peaceful coexistence (and, consequently, detente) as a form of class struggle, and the United States could interpret them as a Soviet commitment to refuse aid to the national liberation movement and give the United States a free hand in the Third World in exchange for detente. Instead of seeking more sweeping agreements, even if during the conflict (or, more precisely, especially during the conflict), in order to defuse the time-bomb which had been placed under detente, both sides preferred to escalate tension.

We cannot, however, ignore the different roads the two countries traveled to arrive at this confrontation. The USSR always insisted that no one side should have unilateral advantages in the Third World. The United States, on the other hand, was always openly striving to maintain its supremacy and always portrayed our ideology as something aggressive and its own ideology as something defensive. For this reason, even when the USSR acted within the bounds of international law, its behavior was unacceptable from the American standpoint. Naturally, this ideology portraying the Americans as the chosen people could lead only to confrontation.

As a result, in spite of the declaration of the Republic of Zimbabwe's independence in 1980, accompanied by an unofficial mutual understanding between the USSR and the United States, the late 1970's and early 1980's became the period of what could be called the "renaissance of conflicts." Furthermore, it was engendered primarily by the behavior of the great powers: the announcement of the "Reagan doctrine," intended to intensify the confrontation between the East and West in the Third World instead of settling disputes, and the delays in the change of leadership in the USSR, during which the Soviet Union kept the earlier policy of reacting to "imperialist intrigues" afloat out of habit.

All of this hampered political will, turned the USSR-U.S. talks on regional issues into a "conversation between deaf men," precluded attempts to establish a mechanism for these talks, and undermined UN capabilities in this area. This not only increased the number of conflicts and expanded their geographical boundaries, time frame, and military dimensions, but also provoked local forces, which were usually already quite intransigent, to use military means in pursuit of their own goals. Even the most highly professional diplomats and political scientists sacrificed their professionalism to the fanciful ideological instructions they received from their superiors. All of this impeded the settlement in Namibia and stopped all reforms in South Africa. Pretoria made more vigorous efforts to destabilize the "frontline states," and the internal conflicts in Angola and Mozambique began to appear irreparable.

It took the new political thinking to start the process of the political settlement of conflicts. However cautious the West's response to it might be, there is no question that it provided an opportunity to break the deadlock in the southern African policies of the United States and

the USSR. When M.S. Gorbachev addressed the United Nations in December 1988, he was able to say that "there was also the glimmer of hope in this area of our common concerns in 1988. It extended to almost all regional crises, and there has been progress in some places. We welcome it and will contribute as much as we can to it."¹¹ This progress undoubtedly included the agreements signed in New York on 22 December on the settlement in southwestern Africa. After 6 years of futile attempts, it took less than a year to find a solution.

Some Lessons

If this progress is to become the prevailing tendency, however, it is important to learn the right lessons from the earlier confrontations. There are people in the United States and in the USSR who believe that the forceful approach of the Reagan administration compelled the Soviet Union to give up its own goals and make unilateral concessions to a superior force, including concessions in the Third World. The Americans who subscribe to this line of reasoning have concluded that the success of this policy could make its continued pursuit quite advantageous in the future, especially now that the USSR is experiencing difficulties. The people who agree with them in the Soviet Union might believe that after the present period of difficulties is over, all the USSR has to do is gather up its strength and launch a counterattack at the right time. This line of reasoning is characteristic of the opponents of perestroika, who see the search for an external enemy as a means of compensating for internal difficulties and who are promoting a new escalation of tension.

If we look at the situation in the simplest terms, the confrontation in the Third World has two sides: attempts to create new structures in a particular country and attempts to prevent this. Destabilization is always easier and cheaper than stabilization, especially in Africa, where the weakness of national and state institutions makes them vulnerable even to limited foreign interference.

In the period in question, the USSR was the side trying to stabilize the regimes which had come to power with its help in Angola and Mozambique. The United States, on the other hand, was trying to prevent this. This was an exchange of roles in comparison with the period of the Vietnam War. The failure of both powers to surmount the opposition of the other side was not the result of their "weakness," but was due to the very logic of confrontation in an atmosphere of nuclear parity and the comparable military-economic capabilities of the USSR and the United States. The nature of the opposition, in turn, was affected by the atmosphere of confrontation, which had acquired its own dynamic. The "obligation" of one side to intervene stemmed from the very fact of real or even potential action by the other side, and not from its genuine national interests or local conditions.

The question of whether the new regimes were "good" or "bad" usually appeared to be the main motive for the

actions of the great powers. People in the USSR and the United States had opposite answers to the question and backed them up with ideological arguments. The real merits of a system of government, however, could have been revealed in peacetime, but the more democratic the regime, the more difficult it was for it to survive in a state of war. Consequently, the cause of democracy in the Third World was sacrificed, along with the prestige and interests of the great powers, for the sake of global confrontation.

The conflict in southern Africa is a single entity, although it does consist of several conflict situations—the problems of eliminating apartheid in South Africa, granting Namibia its independence, and halting the destabilization of several "frontline states." Furthermore, regulation in South Africa is one of the central problems in the region, and the rest are derivative or peripheral in relation to it. All of them are closely interrelated, however, and they can only be examined individually in theory. Of course, the resolution of the Namibian, Angolan, and other problems could precede the settlement of the more acute crisis in South Africa, but the bases for the resolution of the central problem must be laid during this initial stage. Any other solution would be only temporary. The success of the "sequential" option in Zimbabwe was the first success, and probably the only one, because it showed South Africa that it could expect nothing else but the gradual contraction of its sphere of influence and the eventual elimination of its regime. For this reason, in the beginning of the 1980's, instead of aiding in the resolution of peripheral problems in the region, the South African leadership adopted a "total strategy" aimed at their exacerbation. What is more, it pursued the following goals:

- 1) the guarantee of state security by transferring the seemingly inevitable clash of forces with the outside world beyond national boundaries;
- 2) the maintenance of "order" within the country to facilitate the reform of apartheid according to its own scenario, effectively an extension of the package of "repressive reforms";
- 3) the surmounting of sanctions with the use of neighboring states economically dependent on South Africa as hostages or a potential channel for foreign trade operations in circumvention of these sanctions;
- 4) the guarantee of South African interests in the region in connection with the plan to establish a "constellation of southern African countries" by means of their economic and political integration.

In all probability, if South Africa had been certain that its interests would have been taken into account and would not have suffered much in a political settlement of the southern African conflict as a whole, it might have agreed to a settlement acceptable to it, to the opposition, and to the rest of the world. In the absence of these guarantees, however, the Republic of South Africa has no choice but to secure its own interests—i.e., to fight for

the most convenient solution in line with the idea that "we must do it to them before they do it to us." The latter would simply mean the creation of puppet regimes in Namibia, Angola, and Mozambique or the preservation of a state of crisis there, which would also lead unavoidably to delays in the process of reform in South Africa. By virtue of its military, financial, and economic capabilities, it is able to secure one of these options for a long time, although it will have to pay a high price for this. In spite of the fact that no one, not even South Africa, will be satisfied with this, it is unlikely that anyone can dissuade it.

Guarantees for South Africa

What could realistically serve as guarantees for the Republic of South Africa on the four points listed above, and what kind of concessions could it be expected to make in exchange?

First of all, Pretoria should have a firm guarantee of the cessation and non-resumption of armed attacks from outside the country. This would mean the renunciation of armed struggle by SWAPO, the ANC, and the "frontline states" and the complete and final withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. Besides this, elections should be held in Angola and Namibia under international control and with the participation of all political forces. In exchange, South Africa should legalize the ANC, SACP [South African Communist Party], and SWAPO, guarantee them freedom of political action, release all political prisoners, stop all military aid to UNITA and the MNC, stop the armed attacks on the "frontline states," withdraw troops from Angola and Namibia, and carry out UN Resolution No 435.

This might seem unacceptable at first to the people who are fighting against apartheid, but the very fact that several of these conditions were already included in the New York agreements in 1988 attests to the opposite. Armed struggle against apartheid is important only as one way of stimulating mass activity and as the only real action that can be taken by the black South Africans who are in a desperate state and who have no rights and no legal means of fighting for their rights. In general, however, armed struggle has never been the main element of the fight against apartheid, especially since it could lead to extremism and could provoke the authorities to take harsher repressive steps. The main role has always been played by public demonstrations, strikes, and boycotts. Therefore, the renunciation of armed struggle should not be regarded as the tactical disarmament of the ANC. For Pretoria, however, the legalization of black political movements would represent its contribution to the efforts to direct this struggle into civilized channels.

Second, the value of Pretoria's reforms of apartheid must be acknowledged, however inadequate they might seem at this time. Besides this, South Africa and the international community should reach an understanding

on the dates and conditions of further steps to dismantle apartheid and begin a dialogue by all political forces in southern Africa.

Third, if the two first points are implemented, the threat of new sanctions should be eliminated and a procedure for the cancellation of existing sanctions should be planned.

Fourth, it would be impossible not to recognize the natural economic interests of South Africa as the most developed country in the region, and this means that it would be senseless to try to impede its efforts to offer more financial, technical, and other aid to neighboring countries.

We still have to answer several difficult questions: What are the national interests of the USSR and the United States in southern Africa? Will the two powers be able to agree on a common platform based on these interests for the settlement of the crisis in this region? Do they have any other choice? Beginning at the end, the USSR and the United States are facing the same dilemma: They can either employ peaceful means to reach an internationally recognized, universally acceptable, and consequently stable compromise in the interest of the local population and in their own interest, or they can support their traditional "historical" allies (respectively, the ANC and Pretoria) for the victory of a single side in the struggle. In other words, they must choose between joint (or parallel) action and confrontation. Furthermore, the latter, in view of the interests of the great powers, would seem to be possible only in theory.

The interests of the United States in southern Africa have been officially announced several times. One of the best definitions was presented in former Secretary of State G. Shultz' statement that "not only is there no moral justification for apartheid, but it cannot even survive over the long range."¹² This implies that the United States is sincerely interested in changing the apartheid regime because it is discrediting the capitalist system politically in the eyes of the entire world; because it is inhibiting the economic development of South Africa and reducing the profits of transnational corporations; because it is causing the situation in the region to acquire radical overtones and could lead to social upheavals that might put the South African economy out of commission for a long time and close off the West's access to the region's raw materials; because it is complicating relations between allies; and because it is causing friction in inter-ethnic relations and exacerbating the problem of human rights in the developing countries.

Soviet Interests

Soviet interests in southern Africa have never been formulated officially yet, with the exception of the clearly expressed Soviet opposition to apartheid. Experts have traditionally declared that the sole interest of the USSR is to "aid in the liberation of the southern part of the continent" and have thereby reduced the entire

matter to the "non-recognition and resolute condemnation of the racist regime and participation in all types of boycotts and sanctions against it."¹³ In the first place, this is far from a complete list of Soviet interests and, in the second place, this is a description of the policy of a passive observer. The statement that "the Soviet Union has no special interests in southern Africa" also seems odd.¹⁴

In this case, the adjective "special" is probably an allusion to our traditional renunciation of unfair advantages, although this kind of obtrusive avowal of innocence is unreasonable. It can also be understood, however, as the denial of any noteworthy interests whatsoever.

In this case, it sounds as if the USSR is spending billions of far from surplus rubles for purely philanthropic reasons. Quite frankly, few people would believe this. After all, for a long time the USSR has been an active participant, and not a passive observer, in the southern African conflict, assisting the frontline states and the national liberation movements and incurring substantial material and political losses as a result. If a policy does exist but interests—according to the official statement—do not, this would arouse confusion at best and suspicion at worst, and there are those who would benefit from these suspicions. An official positive, and not negative, declaration of these interests is long overdue and would easily eliminate the suspicions.

It is true that the USSR has always felt a commitment to support the struggle of people for their independence and sovereignty, but this interest is not always diametrically opposed to Western interests, as people believed for a long time. During the period of confrontation, it was virtually submerged under the desire to oppose the West to the maximum. Any actions by the West were categorically interpreted as hostile acts and automatically demanded countermeasures. The same absurd logic directed the actions of the West. The new political thinking demands the reordering of priorities, the renunciation of the practice of interpreting events in the Third World as a struggle for the nominal "inclusion" of various countries among the allies of the East or West, and consideration for the actual economic conditions in the states where the development of capitalist relations is often historically more natural, more beneficial, and therefore more progressive than the artificial and consequently regressive imposition of pseudo-socialistic models. In line with this, the objective is not struggle against capitalism, but assistance in the development of its most civilized and moral forms as a counterbalance to its reactionary forms, such as apartheid.

This policy will correspond to the genuine national interests of the Soviet Union, consisting primarily in the maintenance and development of its existing influence in southern Africa. This will, first of all, allow the USSR to participate in the southern African settlement with the aim of finding the most democratic solutions to the problems of the region and, second, strengthen the

USSR's diplomatic influence in the world and its economic relations with southern African countries, which are important not only in view of the tens of billions of rubles that have already been invested, but also in view of the great potential of these relations.

The Soviet Union's main national interest at this time, however, is the establishment of a regime of "non-apartheid" in South Africa—i.e., a democratic and stable government with which the USSR could establish mutually beneficial diplomatic and economic relations to the fullest extent. This will necessitate a sober assessment of the legitimate interests and actual strength of the white community and of its contribution to the development of South Africa. In addition, the black majority and all political forces (including the ANC and the SACP) must be guaranteed an equitable place in national affairs. It will also require the realization that if we can be certain of anything today about the future government of South Africa, it is the fact that it will be a nationalist government regardless of its racial and class makeup.

The only active element in the USSR's position with regard to South Africa to date—the support of the ANC—signifies the unilateral (the ANC has contacts throughout the world) and narrow (the ANC is not the only opposition force in South Africa) dependence of the USSR on the policy of this organization to the same degree, if not more so, as the position of the United States signifies its dependence on Pretoria's policy. The USSR's passivity in relation to other opposition forces in the country and the Government of South Africa must be surmounted (and has recently begun to be surmounted), because it can only delay the resolution of the conflict for many years instead of aiding in its resolution.

It appears that the USSR and the United States could find a common platform on these terms and give South Africa the previously mentioned guarantees, thereby securing their own interests and the most acceptable settlement in southern Africa. This does not preclude unilateral actions by each country in South Africa, but it is unlikely that either could provide these guarantees on its own. This kind of cooperation would aid in correcting the clearly limited nature of earlier attempts to resolve regional conflicts simply by reducing foreign intervention. Of course, this should have been the first step, but stopping at this point and pretending that the domestic problems giving rise to the conflict are of no consequence whatsoever would make us no better than Pontius Pilate.

In spite of the meeting P. Botha had at the beginning of July with N. Mandela, the ANC leader serving a life prison term, several Western observers and the leaders of the ANC and SACP feel that conditions are not right yet for political negotiations in South Africa and that the government is not ready for any serious discussion of the future of apartheid. It is true that even the ANC believes that it cannot take part in negotiations yet because it is not strong enough for this. In this case as well, however, USSR-U.S. cooperation would at least do the maximum

to encourage a dialogue, limit the confrontation between the two sides and, what is most important, save each other and the people of South Africa from becoming involved in senseless rivalry in the search for solutions to regional problems. This would give all sides a chance to avoid extremism, which cannot serve as the basis of anything valid, whatever noble goals it might pursue.

Footnotes

1. "Materialy XXVII syezda Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuz" [Materials of the 27th CPSU Congress], Moscow, 1986, pp 64, 70; M.S. Gorbachev, "Perestroyka i novoye myshleniye dlya nashey strany i dlya vsego mira" [Perestroyka and the New Thinking for Our Country and the World], Moscow, 1987, p 145.

2. "SSSR i strany Afriki. 1971-1976 gg. Dokumenty i materialy" [The USSR and the African Countries. 1971-1976. Documents and Materials], pt 2, Moscow, 1985, p 8.

3. J. Stockwell, "In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story," New York, 1978, p 193.

4. W. Smith, "A Trap in Angola," FOREIGN POLICY, Spring 1986, No 62, p 68.

5. N. Davis, "The Angola Decision of 1975: A Personal Memoir," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Fall 1978, pp 123-124; J. Stockwell, Op. cit., p 43.

6. "Materialy XXV syezda Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuz" [Materials of the 25th CPSU Congress], Moscow, 1977, p 13; "SSSR i strany Afriki," pt 2, pp 149, 228.

7. H. Kissinger, "Foreign Policy and National Security," THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN, 12 April 1976, p 664.

8. NATO's FIFTEEN NATIONS, 1978, No 3, p 35.

9. "Statement by C. Vance Before the Subcommittee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives," Washington, 19 June 1978.

10. PRAVDA, 31 March 1977.

11. Ibid., 8 December 1988.

12. THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN, June 1985, p 22.

13. "Aktualnyye problemy otnosheniy SSSR so stranami Afriki (80-ye gody)" [Current Issues in the USSR's Relations with African Countries (1980's)], Moscow, 1985, p 6.

14. M.S. Gorbachev, Op. cit., p 196.

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NOTES AND COMMENTS

USSR-United States: Peaceful Dialogue of the Military

90UI0171D Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 10, Oct 89
(signed to press 26 Sep 89) pp 61-63

[Article by Yu.A. Koshkin]

[Text] One of the areas in which impressive changes have taken place in the last few years is the growing sphere of USSR-U.S. politico-military contacts and direct contacts by members of the armed forces of both countries. If the author of this article had been told 3 years ago that he would soon be meeting several dozen American officers and generals and would have a chance to walk down the hallways of the Pentagon, he would not have believed it. Nevertheless, this is only a small part of a rapidly accelerating process.

The program of Soviet-American military contacts could be the envy of creative artists: meetings by military historians, medical personnel, and employees of military museums, mutual visits by military academy cadets, the attendance of combat maneuvers, etc.

Although it might seem paradoxical at first, Soviet and American soldiers quickly find a common language: After all, regardless of differences in countries and sociopolitical systems, the armed forces have much in common and military specialists have something to discuss. We should not forget that for many years we were taught to look at each other through the sights of a gun. This makes it all the more gratifying that reason and humaneness have prevailed over subtle ideological and psychological influences. The American generals who come here to attend combat maneuvers and have never been in the Soviet Union before, are assured of the hospitality of their hosts within 2 or 3 days, and the overwhelming majority of them are on their best behavior. The first visits were not devoid of peculiar incidents: Some of the people who did not want to take any risks brought bouillon cubes with them from the United States. Fortunately, stereotypes are disintegrating more quickly than anyone expected.

Of course, we should not confuse wishes with facts and say that there are no people left in either country who feel that broader contacts can be dangerous because they can undermine combat capabilities and weaken ideological convictions, particularly in view of the fact that in the armed forces, in contrast to other spheres where Soviet-American contacts are being developed, the opposite side is still regarded as the most probable adversary. This is inevitably reflected in the training of soldiers, but any sensible person has to be pleased by the process the political leaders of the USSR and the United States set in motion.

It is particularly important that young people, the military academy cadets in both countries, have a chance to

communicate with each other. After all, much will depend on them, tomorrow's officers and generals. It was a good sign that when Soviet officers visited the U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis, the cadets did not treat them with hostility or suspicion. In fact, the prevailing mood was one of youthful curiosity and a desire for maximum knowledge and understanding.

The intergovernmental agreement on the prevention of dangerous military activity, which was signed when Admiral W. Crowe, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, visited the Soviet Union, was a significant result of the broader politico-military contacts between the USSR and the United States. The very idea of drafting this kind of agreement was the result of direct contact between high-ranking officers in the Soviet and American armed forces.

This agreement can be called unprecedented in several respects. Without going into the details, which were reported in IZVESTIYA and analyzed in depth in KRA-SNAYA ZVEZDA on 13 June 1989, we can single out the following points. The agreement covers the activities of the armed forces of the two countries on land, at sea, and in the air. Representatives of all branches of the armed forces, with the exception of strategic missile forces, took part in drafting the agreement. The participation of this many agencies always requires considerable coordination. In spite of this, the document was drafted and signed in record time—in less than a year. The main negotiating partners were military leaders, but representatives of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the U.S. State Department also took part in the talks. The delegations were headed by Maj Gen A.V. Bolyatko on the Soviet side and Maj Gen J. Butler on the American side.

The successful completion of the drafting of the agreement in such a short time was made possible by an intensive work schedule: The joint Soviet-American working group met monthly, alternately in Moscow and Washington. It is extremely significant that the chief of General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces and the chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff followed the work of the delegations with great interest and gave them all kinds of assistance. The frequent meetings promoted the development of personal contacts between officers and better mutual understanding between delegation members. The increasing trust between the two sides was apparent to everyone, friendly relations were established, and the wish to complete the work successfully grew stronger each day.

Of course, one of the factors contributing to this success was the competence of the delegation leaders, whose role in drafting the agreement would be difficult to overestimate. During the talks all of the participants revealed a thorough knowledge of the subject matter, flexibility, and a desire to understand the partner and find a mutually acceptable compromise. In view of the efforts the two leaders made to ensure the successful completion

of the document, the names of Bolyatko and Butler deserve to be included in the title of this important document.

It would be difficult to overestimate the importance of this agreement. In our day, now that any incident involving the armed forces of the USSR and the United States can have disastrous results, measures to prevent or to regulate dangerous military actions constitute an important way of achieving a safer and more predictable world. The agreement confirms the desire of the two sides to avert tension. It is equally important, however, that the document envisages specific measures to be taken by military officials for the peaceful regulation of incidents. There is also another significant aspect—the humanization of relations. The agreement, which was drafted for the purpose of preventing the escalation of dangerous military actions, refers not only to aircraft and ships, but also to individual soldiers. In essence, this colossal work was done precisely to save the life of each individual. Who knows, if this agreement had made its appearance 5 years ago, the fatal bullets fired by the soldier from the group of Soviet troops in Germany might not have taken the life of American Major Nicholson.

The extreme importance of the analysis of the drafting of this agreement, just as, incidentally, the role of the entire group of Soviet-American politico-military contacts, goes beyond international security considerations. Communication with American soldiers provides opportunities for comparison and contrast. Whether we like it or not, these comparisons point up the superior and inferior features of the armed forces of the USSR. Fortunately, today we can openly discuss everything impeding our work and diminishing the effectiveness of our labor, including the work of the soldier.

Useful experience is particularly necessary to us today, now that the armed forces are being reduced and the heightened professionalism of the Soviet military is being considered. We should recall that these matters have been the object of deep concern in the United States in recent years—ever since voluntary enlistment was instituted in 1973.

American observers at Soviet troop exercises have mentioned several times that many of the functions performed by our officers are part of the duties of an American sergeant. Of course, the American sergeant is a career soldier, and some of them serve longer than officers and earn a high salary, but this objective fact cannot explain or excuse a situation in which the loading of a tank onto a railway platform in our country is supervised by up to five officers under the command of a senior officer. We cannot afford this kind of extravagance. They are also amazed when they see a senior ensign directing traffic on a country road. Americans feel that this is a job for a corporal.

These might not be the best examples, but the tendency is self-evident. It is the result of a lack of trust in the

soldier, the serviceman. It is the product of a long chain of general distrust: The officer distrusts the sergeant, the senior officer distrusts the junior officer, the general distrusts the senior officer, and, regrettably, so on and so forth.... This situation must be changed.

First of all, this is an extremely inefficient system. Second, it entails huge expenditures, which are all the more impermissible when allocations for military needs are being cut. Finally, in connection with the reduction of the armed forces, the exemption of students from military service, and the declared priority of the qualitative aspects of armed forces construction, we simply cannot afford to have each small group of soldiers supervised by an officer.

The situation fostering the distrust of senior officers and highly skilled specialists with an academic education is even less tolerable. It is intolerable when an expert is not given a chance to express his views on a problem. As a result, efficiency declines and the work suffers. In addition to everything else, this approach fosters an unhealthy and far from constructive atmosphere. This is particularly apparent when you watch American officers at work: There is no familiarity whatsoever with higher-ranking officers, but the prevailing mood is one of goodwill and a desire to work together to solve problems. The decisive factor of leadership is the competence of the specialist.

A clearly delineated system of incentives, rewards for initiative, and the constant elevation of professional ranks (including the ranks in civilian academic institutions) have created a corps of career officers in the United States, most of whom are resourceful, emancipated, and free of servility toward superiors. We must study this if we want to avoid excessive centralization, bordering on diktat, and the suppression of all original ideas.

The agreement signed by the governments of the USSR and the United States on the prevention of dangerous military operations, which will go into effect on 1 January 1990, testifies that the emerging spirit of mutual understanding between them in the sphere of international security has taken more concrete form. They have taken another step toward one another and away from the precipice. The military departments of the two countries played a decisive role in this process.

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THINKING OVER A BOOK

New Thinking and the Burden of the Past

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IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 10, Oct 89
(signed to press 26 Sep 89) pp 73-78

[Review by Valentin Mikhaylovich Berezhkov, doctor of historical sciences and senior consulting scientific associate at Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies, of book "Soviet Diplomacy and Negotiating Behavior—

1979-88: New Tests for U.S. Diplomacy," Washington, Government Printing Office, 1988, 876 pages]

[Text] An official study entitled "Soviet Diplomacy and Negotiating Behavior—1979-88: New Tests for U.S. Diplomacy" has been published in Washington. This is the second work by a group of experts from the Congressional Research Service under the supervision of chief expert on international affairs Joseph Whelan. The first, published in 1979, was an attempt to cover Soviet foreign policy activity in the 1960's.¹

In the second volume (in contrast to the first), the authors do not confine themselves to references to the judgments of Western experts but also mention, even if only in passing, Soviet sources. This alone can be viewed as a move in the direction of the "new thinking" and an indirect acknowledgement of the groundlessness of the earlier approach, which completely ignored our official statements and documents on the goals of Soviet foreign policy. It is regrettable, however, that several important materials have been left out, such as M.S. Gorbachev's statement of 15 January 1986, proposing the elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000, and his book "Perestroika i novoye myshleniye dlya nashey strany i dlya vsego mira" [Perestroika; New Thinking for Our Country and the World], without which an accurate and comprehensive assessment of the current stage of Soviet diplomacy is impossible. All of this makes the study in question a faulty and hopeless basis for an understanding of this subject matter. In an introduction to the book, however, Dante Fascell, chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, says that he attaches great importance to this study in connection with the serious changes that have taken place in the Soviet Union in recent years. The election of M.S. Gorbachev as general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Fascell says, "gave American foreign policy unprecedented opportunities and challenged the U.S. relationship with the Soviet Union." The study, he goes on to say in the introduction, "provides a valuable opportunity to look into the negotiating techniques of the Soviet Union and decide how American policymakers and diplomats might respond to these in order to obtain results corresponding to U.S. foreign policy and national security goals" (p iii).

I am afraid, however, that Fascell overestimates the contents of the study because, as we will see, the mentality of the researchers is still weighed down by the burden of the past.

The study in question is a voluminous work (almost 900 pages). It is interesting primarily because it contains huge quantities of information and observations gathered during Soviet-American talks at various levels, including summit meetings, and conveys the atmosphere of the conferences.

The authors concentrate mainly on the summit meetings in Vienna in 1979 and Geneva in 1985. They probably had a definite reason for doing this: The last meeting of

the Brezhnev era took place in Vienna and Gorbachev's first meeting was in Geneva.

The researchers describe the situation preceding the Vienna summit as an extremely complex atmosphere: the turbulent changes in the world, the move from the bipolar model to the multipolar one, the changes in the balance of power between the two competing military blocs, the spread of international terrorism, the rise of nationalism in the "Third World," the increasing acknowledgement of interdependence, the influence of the technological revolution, and the rise of Islamic fundamentalism.

Although, as we remember, influential forces in the United States were then stubbornly pushing Washington into confrontations with the USSR and escalating international tension, the authors of the study assert that the Carter administration was striving to maintain detente, viewing it as the "external structure" of relations with Moscow. The internal nucleus, in their opinion, was the SALT II treaty. The external situation, however, "underwent severe tests due to Soviet infiltration of the Third World, which reached its highest point when the Soviet troops were sent into Afghanistan," they explain (p xxxvii).

Some remaining traces of the constructive approach still existed in June 1979 in Vienna, however, and this, in the authors' opinion, made the signing of the SALT II treaty possible. The atmosphere at that meeting is described mainly in the words of Z. Brzezinski, who was then the President's national security adviser. By the end of the talks Brzezinski was shocked by the change in Brezhnev's state of health. "At dinner the night before he had seemed to be in fairly good shape..." Brzezinski recalls, "but at the next meeting he was on the verge of exhaustion." In general, Brezhnev seemed to Brzezinski to be "a man deserving genuine pity because he was trying his best to represent the Soviet Union in spite of serious physical disabilities." The President told his national security adviser that during their private meeting Brezhnev "was incapable of carrying on a direct and unofficial conversation. His interpreter had brought a file folder with statements on a broad range of topics. Every time Carter asked a question, the interpreter would take out the appropriate statement and give it to Brezhnev, who would then read it out loud." According to Brzezinski (who speaks Russian), Brezhnev "relied heavily on Gromyko during the official talks whenever he was present. Gromyko whispered quiet but precise instructions to him. Sometimes," Brzezinski recalls, "Gromyko would lean toward Brezhnev and say, 'No, do not agree to this,' and sometimes he would point to the text lying on the table in front of Brezhnev, showing him what to read and where to stop reading" (pp 109-110).

The Reagan presidency, which began with pointed anti-Soviet rhetoric, is discussed at length in the book. The researchers believe that the entry of Afghanistan by Soviet troops "signalled the end of detente to the United States, the end of the strategic arms limitation process

and a return to the policy of the global containment of the Soviet Union. This revived the American idea of advance frontiers, known to the Soviet side as 'neoglobalism.' This idea first made its appearance in the form of the Carter doctrine, which declared that the United States had vital interests in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East and called for a substantial buildup of military strength. On the domestic level, the events in Afghanistan led to a tougher line in relations with Moscow and caused the pendulum to swing from a position left of center to a position right of center." The nature of U.S. foreign and domestic policy was clearly conservative, the book says, during the entire period in question (p 148).

It is interesting, however, that at the height of the "second cold war," for which both sides were responsible, the White House attempted to make contact with Moscow, according to documents cited in the work under review, and even planned to hold summit meetings after Brezhnev died and Yu.V. Andropov was elected general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. Washington's official reaction to Andropov's statement of 21 December 1982, proposing the creation of a nuclear-free zone in Europe, was negative. Nevertheless, the talks between Soviet and American representatives in Geneva continued. In reference to this period, the authors of the study write:

"The rhetoric of the leaders of the two countries seemed to reach the height of hostility when President Reagan described the Soviet Union as the 'focus of evil in today's world'" in his speech to the annual conference of the National Evangelists Association on 8 March 1983, and when General Secretary Andropov accused the President on 26 March of telling deliberate lies (pp 201-202). The situation was complicated by the heated arguments over Reagan's "Strategic Defense Initiative." Here is how the authors sum it up: "In the presence of this negative interplay between the superpowers, the spring of 1983 seemed to offer little hope of a return to reason or at least to the bearable form of 'normality' in their relations." It turns out, however, that there was another side to the coin: "In spite of the somber political atmosphere, positive indications had begun accumulating by August, reinforcing the lively speculation about a possible meeting between Andropov and Reagan" (p 202).

The authors list these indications as the resumption of "Dobrynin's secret talks with Shultz, reinstating the practice of Dobrynin's meetings with Kissinger," Averell Harriman's call on Andropov in summer 1983, the visits to Moscow by two delegations of U.S. congressmen, and the changing postures of the sides at the strategic arms reduction talks in Geneva.

Some changes were apparent in the USSR at that time. Attempts were made to lead the country out of stagnation, a struggle was launched against corruption, economic inefficiency, apathy, and negligent behavior, and there were perceptible attempts to emerge from the state of international isolation. These were only the first steps,

but the main thing was that things were on the move. The study in question, however, describes the Soviet position as an absolutely static one. Here is the authors' comparative analysis of U.S. and Soviet ideas on the eve of the meeting the White House had planned for Reagan and Andropov: the acceptance of regulated relations based on individual choice (United States) as the fundamental principle in world affairs, in contrast to adherence to the doctrine of permanent revolution, in which the social and political leadership of the state prevails over individual interests (USSR); tolerance for political diversity and a preference for popular rule as an essential principle of government, in contrast to the demand for absolute unanimity and political totalitarianism; an emphasis on the rational approach and on the spirit of compromise in the settlement of differences, in contrast to the belief in constant conflicts between opposing political systems, in which the settlement of differences is viewed exclusively as a temporary convenience; the acceptance of force as an effective principle in international affairs, to be used in cases regarded by the Americans as defensive, or even offensive at times, if important state interests are at stake, in contrast to the Soviet belief in the use of force for the promotion of communist ideals in revolutionary and aggressive wars (pp 208-209).

It is easy to see that this presents a clearly idealized picture of the United States and a terrifying picture of the Soviet Union and its policies. The authors should have remembered that some objectives, such as the "export of revolution," were already being condemned by our party in the 1920's. Because the authors do not take obvious facts into consideration, they ascribe the highest ideals and ambitions to the United States and paint Soviet goals in sinister colors, apparently to reinforce the idea of the "evil empire." Nevertheless, the authors do state that "although President Reagan, as a realist, viewed the Soviet Union as an ideological adversary, he also saw it as the opposite great power, with which the United States should establish stable and constructive relations" (p 209).

Reagan also had his difficulties, however. "Aside from discussions with people who shared his own opinions," the authors state, "the President had no real experience in foreign policy negotiation, especially in a situation of intense confrontation. His limited experience and knowledge of international issues made him unprepared and defenseless against the Soviet representatives, who were of a completely different breed.... For this reason, he would have been an ineffectual negotiator in a meeting with Andropov" (p 223).

The incident involving the South Korean airliner, accompanied by a new outburst of anti-Soviet hysteria, the deployment of the American Pershings in Western Europe, our ostentatious withdrawal from the talks in Geneva, and then the death of Yu.V. Andropov—all of this created a situation in which a summit meeting was out of the question. For many months the storm clouds of "cold war" began gathering again.

A fundamentally new situation, conducive to the resumption of the Soviet-American dialogue, began to take shape after M.S. Gorbachev was elected general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee in March 1985. The willingness of the Soviet side to "also improve relations with the United States of America to our mutual advantage and without any attempts to infringe upon each other's legal rights and interests" was underscored at the April (1985) CPSU Central Committee Plenum. "We would like to hope that the United States' current posture will undergo adjustments. This would provide an opportunity for the conclusion of mutually acceptable agreements. This kind of willingness is apparent on our side."²

The authors speak at length of the period which began when Vice President G. Bush, the head of the American delegation at K.U. Chernenko's funeral, conveyed a message from R. Reagan to M.S. Gorbachev, suggesting a summit meeting in Washington. The Russian side responded with fundamental acquiescence, but the final agreement was not reached until the middle of the summer, when the two leaders decided to meet in Geneva in November 1985. The months preceding the summit are described in the study as a time when both sides were maneuvering for the best possible position at the upcoming talks. After receiving Soviet consent, the Reagan administration "tried to downplay the meeting, depicting it as a simple get-together where the leaders would become acquainted, apparently to avoid arousing unfounded expectations of success both within the country and abroad and thereby weakening Reagan's initial position with the impression that he was quite eager for the meeting" (p 246).

People in Washington were trying to evaluate the new Soviet leader at that time. The following statements are cited in the study: "Gorbachev's performance as general secretary up to the time of the Geneva meeting indicates that he is an extremely confident and energetic leader who thinks before he acts.... In general, in Geneva President Reagan will be meeting an impressive adversary, a persistent, pragmatic, strong, and well-informed man with firm principles who has set well-coordinated domestic and foreign policy goals" (pp 250-253).

As for Reagan, the authors of the study feel that by the end of 1985 he was already prepared to test his strength against that of the Soviet leader: "Many serious flaws of the administration's first term seemed to have been corrected. The White House staff, headed by the President's national security adviser, R. McFarlane, was reinforced with highly professional personnel with a thorough understanding of the purpose and role of negotiation in U.S. relations with Moscow" (p 255).

As the authors point out, serious pressure was being exerted on Reagan for a summit meeting. The President himself was also more and more inclined to favor the idea. He felt the need to transcend domestic issues, and his opinions were supported by many influential people. Senator Paul Laxalt, one of the President's closest

friends, once told him: "Ron, however important it might seem, you must never think that the Almighty wanted you to save only the economy. You have been given a more important mission—to hammer out a major agreement with the Soviets one fine day...."

The authors of the study also recall that Nancy Reagan encouraged the President to conduct summit negotiations because "she understood him and knew that this was what he really wanted. She realized that, deep down, the President wanted to do something that would change our relations with the Russians radically." Mrs. Reagan, the study goes on to say, was also concerned (even more than the President himself) about his place in history and apparently assumed that the summit meeting would play a positive role. Other people close to the President were also in favor of a summit, including Vice President G. Bush, Secretary of State G. Shultz, R. McFarlane, J. Baker, and M. Deaver (p 255).

The list of Reagan's advisers prior to the Geneva meeting is also of definite interest. They included W. Hyland, the FOREIGN AFFAIRS editor who had been Kissinger's chief aide when he was secretary of state; J. Billington, director of the Wilson Center in Washington and expert on Russian history and culture; A. Gorelik, director of the RAND Corporation's Soviet research department; A. Ulam, professor of history and international relations at Harvard University; R. Pipes, professor of Russian history—also from Harvard—and Reagan's former assistant in the National Security Council; writer Susannah Macy, the author of books on Russian history and culture; and Arkadiy Shevchenko, a former Soviet diplomat who had stayed in the United States (p 260). Besides this, the President watched some videotapes of Gorbachev and several Soviet movies showing in Moscow at that time. In addition, there was something like a set of rehearsals, in which J. Matlock, the present U.S. ambassador to the USSR, played the Gorbachev "role."

Nevertheless, we still wonder what kind of impression the President had of the Soviet Union, its policies, its goals, and its ambitions after all of these consultations. Judging by the description of the positions of the two sides in this study, it appears that the views which had prevailed earlier in the Reagan camp underwent few changes. In fact, the authors' summary reflects the same feelings that had prevailed in Washington two and a half years earlier, when Reagan's possible meeting with Andropov was being considered. There are numerous quotations in the study of Reagan's remarks to the effect that he was going to Geneva on a "peace mission," that he hoped that the meeting with Gorbachev would "lead to the creation of a more open world," and so forth, and all of this is followed by a conclusion: "In short, the President wanted what every president of the United States since Roosevelt wanted, namely a democratic solution to Soviet-American problems and the establishment of stability and peace on earth, aims with which the Soviet Union was not completely in agreement" (p 269).

This conclusion sounds like a repetition of the old hackneyed stereotypes which are unsuitable in a study with scientific aspirations. I do not think that serious American academics would say that all of the U.S. presidents since Roosevelt have been guided by exclusively noble and unselfish motives. And where did the authors get the idea that the Soviet Union was "not completely in agreement" with the wish for "stability and peace"? After all, this wish has been declared repeatedly at the very highest levels on the Soviet side. It is obvious that the statements of American leaders are not open to even the slightest question, whereas Soviet official statements are not only completely ignored, but are also replaced with arbitrary conjectures. Methods of this kind are far from scientific.

The authors do not mention that another anti-Soviet campaign was launched in the United States at that time and was accompanied by belligerent actions having nothing in common with the declared wish for a "stable world." In response to the Soviet moratorium of several months' standing, the U.S. administration conducted another nuclear test, and it responded to Moscow's proposal regarding peace in space with the first combat test of the antisatellite weapon. This was pointed out by M.S. Gorbachev in his TIME magazine interview at the end of August 1985. He expressed regret over the new campaign of hatred against the USSR in Washington. Incidentally, the authors of the study could have cited an authoritative explanation of the Soviet leadership's position from the same interview: "As for us, we are not calling the United States the 'evil empire.' We know what the United States is, who the American people are, and what their role in the world is. We are in favor of a new and better stage in our relationship, but if events reach the point of the qualitatively new phase of the arms race I mentioned, the task will be much more difficult, if not impossible. This is why we are asking the United States to negotiate seriously with us on strategic nuclear weapons, intermediate-range weapons, and space issues."³

One of the serious shortcomings in this study is the fact that the three latest summit meetings, in Reykjavik, Washington, and Moscow, are mentioned only briefly. If the authors had wanted to cover the period through 1988, and this is what the title of the book implies, a thorough analysis of these meetings, especially the Washington and Moscow summits, would have been absolutely essential. After all, important decisions were made there, and the analysis of Soviet diplomatic practices and behavior during the talks in Washington and Moscow could have provided the researchers with indispensable material for objective conclusions and judgments. The chronicle of 1988 is also incomplete because of the omission of M.S. Gorbachev's UN speech in December, which aroused widespread interest in the world.

Footnotes

1. SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1980, No 4, p 117.

2. "Materialy Plenuma Tsentralnogo Komiteta KPSS. 23 aprelya 1985 g." [Materials of the CPSU Central Committee Plenum of 23 April 1985], Moscow, 1985, pp 26-27.

3. M.S. Gorbachev, "Izbrannyye rechi i statyi" [Selected Speeches and Articles], vol 2, Moscow, 1987, pp 360, 364.

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